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We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone 
economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP 
growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. 
That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than 
countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth 
model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial 
fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generate borrowing 
constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous 
real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of 
currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises 
occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit 
risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The 
design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of 
foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread 
bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, where the nontradables sector falls more 
than the tradables sector in the wake of crises. 
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 1 Introduction
Over the last two decades most of the fastest growing countries of the developing world have
experienced lending booms and ﬁnancial crises. Countries in which credit growth has been
smooth have, by contrast, exhibited the lowest growth rates. It would thus appear that
factors that contribute to ﬁnancial fragility have also been a source of growth, even if they
have led to occasional crises.
The linkbetween ﬁnancial fragility and long run growth is associated with two views
of ﬁnancial liberalization. In one view, ﬁnancial liberalization induces excessive risk-taking,
increases macroeconomic volatility and leads to more frequent crises. In another view, lib-
eralization strengthens ﬁnancial development and contributes to higher long-run growth.
In this paper we bring these two views together. First, we document a robust empirical
linkbetween higher growth and a propensity for crisis. Second, we present a model that
establishes a linkbetween crises models and growth models, and show that the two views
of liberalization are complementary. We analyze the relationship between ﬁnancial fragility
and growth in an economy where credit market imperfections imply that a high growth
path requires credit riskand the possibility of crisis. Furthermore, we carry out a welfare
analysis and establish conditions under which the welfare costs of crises are outweighed by
the beneﬁts of higher growth.
The paper is in two parts. The ﬁrst part is empirical and the second is a model. The
empirical section establishes the linkbetween higher GDP growth and negative skewness
in credit growth across countries with active ﬁnancial markets. This ﬁnding indicates that
countries with stable credit market conditions have on average grown more slowly than
countries that have experienced occasional crises, and have a credit growth rate distribution
with a long left tail.1 But this does not imply that ﬁnancial crises are good for growth. It
suggests that undertaking credit risk has led to higher growth, but as a side-eﬀect, it has
also led to occasional crises.
In our empirical analysis, we ﬁnd that the linkbetween bumpiness and growth is not
evident across countries with a high degree of contract enforceability (HECs), but only across
1Negative skewness indicates that good results are clustered closer to the mean than bad results. In
other words, credit contractions are more abrupt and rare than credit expansions.
2those with moderate contract enforceability (MECs). In fact, over the past two decades most
HECs have experienced skewness of credit growth that is near zero.
Thailand and India are contrasting examples of a steep but crisis prone growth path and
a slow but safe growth path. Thailand has experienced lending booms and crises, while India
has pursued a safe growth path for credit (see Figure 1). GDP per capita grew by only 99%
between 1980 and 2001 in India, whereas Thailand’s GDP per capita grew by 148%, despite
having experienced a major crisis.2
The literature has shown that economic growth is negatively correlated with the variance
of several macro aggregates. These ﬁndings do not conﬂict with our results: variance is just
not a good instrument with which to capture the uneven progress associated with ﬁnancial
fragility. For instance, a country which experiences high frequency shocks will exhibit a high
variance in credit growth even though it experiences neither the booms nor the busts of
countries that are ﬁnancially fragile.
The second part of the paper presents a model that links ﬁnancial fragility and long-run
growth, and derives the welfare implications of such a link. The model is designed to account
also for prominent features of recent crisis episodes in MECs. Not only are crises marked by
dramatic real depreciations, ﬁresales and widespread bankruptcies, but they are characterized
by a sharp sectorial asymmetry: output drops far more in the nontradables (N) sector than
in the tradables (T) sector. Closely related to this asymmetric sectorial response is the
denomination of N-sector debt in foreign currency. In the model this currency mismatch is
the source of ﬁnancial fragility.
To explain the linkbetween bumpiness and growth and at the same time account for the
sectorial asymmetric response to crises, we consider a two-sector endogenous growth model
with two credit market imperfections. First, there are contract enforceability problems that
generate domestic ﬁnancing constraints. These constraints aﬀect primarily N-ﬁrms, as T-
ﬁrms have access to world capital markets. Second, there are bailout guarantees that insure
lenders only against systemic crises.3
There is an equilibrium where crises never occur. Along this safe path the N-sector
2This fact is more remarkable given that in 1980 India’s GDP was only about one ﬁfth of Thailand’s.
3We model these two imperfections as in Schneider and Tornell (2003). Their empirical relevance in
MECs is analyzed in Tornell and Westermann (2003) .
3exhibits low growth because its investment is constrained by its cash ﬂow. Since N-goods
serve as intermediate inputs for both sectors, the N-sector constrains the long-run growth of
the T-sector and that of GDP: there is a bottleneck.
However, under some circumstances there is also a risky equilibrium in which endogenous
real exchange rate riskarises and ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to tak e on credit riskin the form of
currency mismatch. This risky behavior eases borrowing constraints, increases investment,
alleviates the bottleneck and allows both sectors to grow faster. However, it also generates
ﬁnancial fragility, as a shift in expectations can cause a sharp real depreciation and land the
economy in a crisis.
Crises are costly. Real depreciation leads to ﬁresales and bankrupts N-sector ﬁrms with
foreign currency debt on their books. Furthermore, the resultant collapse in cash ﬂow de-
presses new credit and investment, hampering growth. We askthe question: does the credit
riskthat leads to ﬁnancial fragility increase long run GDP growth by compensating for the
eﬀects of contract enforceability problems? Our ﬁrst theoretical result is that a ﬁnancially
fragile economy will, on average, grow faster than a safe economy even if crisis costs are
large, provided that contract enforceability problems are severe, but not too severe. This
result follows, in part, from the fact that crises must be rare events in order for credit risk
to be proﬁtable for individual borrowers. Since crises must be rare events in order for them
to occur in equilibrium and during a crisis credit falls abruptly but recuperates gradually, in
the model negative skewness of credit growth is associated with higher long-run growth.
Having a microfounded model allows us to examine the relationship between ﬁnancial
fragility, production eﬃciency and social welfare. Because both sectors compete every period
for the available supply of N-goods, when contract enforceability problems are very severe,
the N-sector attains low leverage and commands only a small share of N-inputs. This results
in a socially ineﬃcient low growth path: a central planner would increase the N-sector
investment share to attain the Pareto optimal allocation.
Clearly, the ﬁrst best can be attained in a decentralized economy by reducing the agency
problems that generate the ﬁnancing constraints. However, if such a reform is not feasi-
ble, credit riskmay be a second best instrument to increase social welfare despite ﬁnancial
fragility. Our second theoretical result is that when contract enforceability problems are se-
4vere, but not too severe, and crisis costs are not too large, credit riskincreases social welfare
and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level.
The existence of the risky equilibrium depends on systemic bailout guarantees. Since
these guarantees are funded by domestic taxation the question arises as to whether such a
policy can be implemented. We show that if N-inputs are intensively used in T-production,
the T-sector will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to fund the ﬁscal cost of the guarantees. The funding
of the guarantees actually eﬀects a redistribution from the non-constrained T-sector to the
constrained N-sector. This redistribution is to the mutual beneﬁt of both sectors because
T-production enjoys cheaper and more abundant N-inputs, and its growth rate increases:
the bottleneck is eased. Thus, even those who bear the costs of crises may be willing to pay
their price.
We wish to make a few comments on how our model relates to the literature.4 First, the
credit cycles in this paper are diﬀerent from Schumpeterian cycles in which the adoption of
new technologies plays a key role. Rather our cycles resemble Juglar credit cycles. Second,
although our model contains some elements of third generation crisis models, it is primarily
a two-sector long-run growth model where crises can occur. This allows for explicit welfare
analysis.
Finally, our empirical ﬁnding that bumpiness is associated with higher long-run growth
oﬀers an explanation for the positive linkbetween ﬁnancial liberalization and growth found
by some researchers, and the positive impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on the frequency of
crises ﬁnd by others. Our model can help explain why, by allowing agents to take on more
credit riskand easing borrowing constraints, ﬁnancial l iberalization may lead to both higher
growth and a greater incidence of crises.
Section 2 contains our empirical ﬁndings. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives
the limit distributions of output and credit growth, and links the model to our empirical
ﬁndings. Section 5 analyzes production eﬃciency and welfare. Section 6 relates our paper
to the literature. Section 7 concludes.
4See Section 6 for a detailed review of the literature.
52 Bumpiness and Growth: The Empirical Link
Here, we investigate whether countries with risky credit paths that have experienced ﬁnancial
crises have grown faster, on average, than other countries. We will measure the incidence
of ﬁnancial crises with the negative skewness of real credit growth.5 Along a boom-bust
episode there is high credit growth during the lending boom, a sharp and abrupt downward
jump during the crisis, and slow credit growth during the credit crunch that develops in the
wake of the crisis. Since credit does not experience sharp jumps during the boom and crises
happen only occasionally, the distribution of credit growth rates is characterized by negative
outliers.6 Therefore, countries that experience a boom-bust episode exhibit a negatively
skewed distribution of credit growth. For this reason we will refer to negative skewness as
bumpiness.7
Boom-bust episodes are associated not only with negative skewness, but also with high
variance of credit growth —the typical measure of volatility in the literature. We choose
not to use the variance to identify risky credit paths that lead to infrequent crises because
high variance may also reﬂect high frequency shocks, which might be exogenous or might
be self-inﬂicted by, for instance, bad economic policy. Since high frequency shocks are more
abundant in the sample we consider than the rare crises that punctuate lending booms,
variance is not a good means of distinguishing risky from safe paths.
In principle, we could also identify countries that have followed risky paths by looking
5Skewness is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of the series around its mean and is computed






￿ σ , where ¯ y is the mean and ˆ σ is the standard deviation. The skewness of a symmetric
distribution, such as the normal distribution, is zero. Positive skewness means that the distribution has a
long right tail and negative skewness implies that the distribution has a long left tail.
6During a lending boom there are positive growth rates that are above normal. However, they are not
positive outliers because the lending boom takes place for several years. Only a positive one-period jump in
credit would create a positive outlier in growth rates. For instance, Thailand experienced a lending boom
for almost all of the sample period and most of the distribtuion is centered around a very high mean.
7Crises are rare events and in a short sample period not all risky lending booms need to end in a bust
(see Gourinchas et. al (2001) and Tornell and Westermann (2002)). Countries that experience risky lending
booms without having a crisis do not exhibit a negatively skewed distribution of credit growth. Notice,
however, that during our sample period (1980-1999) most countries that have followed risky credit paths
have experienced at least one major crisis.
6Figure 1: Safe vs. Risky Growth Paths




















Note: The values for 1980 are normalized to one.  
at the skewness of GDP growth. In practice, however, this may be unreliable because the
tradables sector is typically not negatively aﬀected during crises. Since this sector has access
to world capital markets, tradables production does not decline as much as nontradables
production during crises and often goes up (due to the real depreciation in the exchange
rate). As a result, the decline in GDP is much milder than the decline in credit.8
The kernel distributions of credit growth rates for India and Thailand are given in Figure
2.9 India, the safe country, has a low mean and is quite tightly distributed around the mean
—with skewness close to zero. Meanwhile, Thailand, the risky country, has a very asymmetric
8Furthermore, our model indicates that skewness of GDP is not as good a test of a risky path as skewness
of credit growth. Because the T-sector has access to international capital markets and beneﬁts from the real
depreciation, the model predicts that a crisis will aﬀect GDP much less than it aﬀects the bank-dependent
N-sector and credit growth.
9The simplest nonparametric density estimate of a distribution of a series is the histogram. The histogram,
however, is sensitive to the choice of origin and is not continuous. We therefore choose the more illustrative
kernel density estimator, which smoothes the bumps in the histogram (see Silverman 1986). Smoothing is
done by putting less weight on observations that are further from the point being evaluated. The Kernel
function by Epanechnikov is given by: 3
4(1−(∆B)
2)I(|∆B|≤1), where ∆B is the growth rate of real credit
and I is the indicator function that takes the value of one if |∆B|≤1 and zero otherwise. The bandwidth,
h, controls for the smoothness of the of the density estimate. The larger is h, the smoother the estimate.
For comparability, we choose the same h for both graphs.
7distribution and is characterized by a much larger negative skewness.
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 India  Thailand 
 Mean   0.021   0.109 
 Std. Dev.   0.014   0.125 
 Skewness  -0.370  -1.108 
 
To establish that the positive relationship between GDP growth and negative skewness
of real credit growth is not speciﬁc to India and Thailand, we use cross-country regressions.
Because our model indicates that countries with extreme contract enforceability problems
will not be able to generate credit risk, we restrict our data to those countries with functioning
ﬁnancial markets. Our criterion for inclusion in the set is that a country have a stock market
turnover-to-GDP ratio of at least 1% in 1998.10 This set contains 66 countries, 52 of which
have data available during the 1980s and 1990s.11
To assess the linkbetween bumpiness and growth we add the three moments of real credit
growth to a standard growth regression:
∆yit = λyi0 + γ
￿Xit + β1µ∆B,it + β2σ∆B,it + β3S∆B,it + εit, (1)
where ∆yit is the average growth rate of per-capita GDP; yi0 is the initial level of per capita
GDP; µ∆B,it,σ ∆B,it and S∆B,it are the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the real
10We have chosen 1998 because it is the year with maximum data availability.
11In order to compute the higher moments, we consider only series for which we have at least ten years of
data. Our source of data is World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.
8credit growth rate, respectively. Xit is a vector of control variables that includes initial
human capital, average population growth rate, and life expectancy. We do not include
investment in (1) as we expect the three moments of credit growth, our variables of interest,
to aﬀect GDP growth through higher investment.12
We estimate the regression in three diﬀerent ways. First, we estimate a standard cross-
section regression by OLS. In this case 1980 is the initial year and the moments of credit
growth are computed over the entire sample period 1980-1999. Second, we estimate a panel
regression using two non-overlapping windows: 1980-1989 and 1990-1999. In this case we
use two sets of credit growth moments, one for each window. Lastly, we use overlapping
averages. We construct 10-year averages starting with the period 1980-1989 and rolling it
forward to the period 1990-1999, for each country and each variable. Thus, each country
has up to 10 data points in the time series dimension.13 We estimate the panel regressions
using generalized least squares. We deal with the resulting autocorrelation in the residuals
by adjusting the standard errors according to Newey and West (1987).14
Table 1 reports the estimation results for the three regressions. We ﬁnd that, after
controlling for the standard variables, the mean growth rate of credit has a positive eﬀect
on long-run GDP growth. This has already been established in the literature. What we
establish is the bumpiness of credit that accompanies high growth across the set of countries
with functioning ﬁnancial markets. The ﬁrst three columns show that negative skewness —a
bumpier growth path— is on average associated with higher GDP growth. These estimates
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the panel regressions and the 10% level in the cross-section.
The model shows that the linkbetween growth and bumpiness exists only across economies
with signiﬁcant contract enforceability problems (that are not too extreme). In the absence
of such problems, the borrowing constraints that drive our results do not arise in equilibrium.
To capture this distinction, we divide our sample into countries with either high or middle
enforceability of contracts (HECs and MECs). We classify as HECs the G7 countries and
12The selection of control variables follows the selection in the previous studies most closely related to
ours: Bekaert, et.al. (2001), and Levine and Renelt (1991).
13Bekaert et.al. (2001) also consider overlapping averages. They look at shorter averages, but this is not
feasible in our case, as the higher moments of credit growth cannot be computed in a meaningful way.
14Our panel is unbalanced because not all series are available for all countries and for all periods.
9those with a Kraay and Kaufman’s rule of law index of no less than 1.4. This classiﬁcation
generates 35 MECs and 17 HECs.15
The fourth column in Table 1 reports the estimation results for a regression equation that
adds to (1) the following three terms: β4 ∗hec∗ µ∆B,it+ β5 ∗ hec ∗σ∆B,it+ β6 ∗hec ∗S∆B,it,
where hec is a dummy variable that equals one for HECs and zero otherwise.16 This column
shows that across MECs there is a strong linkbetween bumpiness and growth. In contrast,
this linkis not evident across HECs. The point estimate of the bumpiness coeﬃcient for
MECs is β3 =0 .25, and it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Meanwhile, that for HECs is only
β3 + β6 =0 .18, and Wald tests reveal that although the mean and the variance of credit
growth have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on GDP growth (at the 5% level), skewness does not. In fact,
HECs have experienced near zero skewness in credit growth during the last two decades.
To interpret the estimate of 0.265 for bumpiness, consider India, with near zero skewness,
and Thailand with skewness of minus two. A point estimate of 0.265 implies that an increase
in the bumpiness index of two (from 0 to -2), increases the average long run GDP growth
rate by 0.53% per year. Is this estimate economically meaningful? To address this question
note that after controlling for the standard variables Thailand grows about 2% more per
year than India. Thus, about a quarter of this growth diﬀerential can be attributed to credit
risktak ing, as measured by the sk ewness of credit growth.
Next, consider the variance of credit growth. Consistent with the literature, the variance
enters with a negative sign and it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all regressions.17 We
can interpret the negative coeﬃcient on variance as capturing the eﬀect of ‘bad volatility’
generated by, for instance, procyclical ﬁscal policy. Meanwhile, the positive coeﬃcient on
15The HECs are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and United States. The MECs
are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe.
16The eﬀects of the moments of credit growth on GDP growth are captured by (β1,β2,β3) in MECs, and
by (β1 + β4,β 2 + β5,β3 +β6) in HECs.
17Ramey and Ramey (1995), and Fatas and Mihov (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy induced volatility is bad
for economic growth.
10Table 1: Bumpiness and Growth
 
















  HEC vs. MEC 
(overlapping) 
        
Initial per capita GDP  -0.914**  -1.165**  -1.269**  -1.061** 
  (0.320) (0.242) (0.060) (0.068) 
Secondary schooling  -0.002  0.009  0.005  0.006 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) 
Population growth  -0.010**  -0.009**  -0.010**  -0.009** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Life expectancy  0.072**  0.165**  0.166**  0.169** 
  (0.015) (0.029) (0.016) (0.016) 
Credit_mean 0.091*  0.151**  0.154**  0.184** 
  (0.048) (0.034) (0.011) (0.014) 
Credit_Variance -0.044**  -0.036**  -0.030**  -0.041** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.006) 
-(Credit_Skewness) 0.211*  0.302**  0.265**  0. 250** 
  (0.119) (0.148) (0.040) (0.093) 
Credit_mean*HEC        -0.142** 
        (0.023) 
Credit_Variance*HEC        -0.009 
        (0.009) 
-(Credit_Skewness)*HEC        -0.072 
        (0.113) 
         
# of observations  51  84  424  424 
 
Note: The table shows the results of the regression.:  
it it B it B it B S ε β σ β µ β γ λ + + + + + = ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆       X y y , 3 , 2 , 1 it ini i, it ,where ∆yit is the average growth rate of per-
capita GDP;  ini i, y  is the initial level of per-capita GDP; and  it B, ∆ µ ,  it B, ∆ σ  and  it B S , ∆  are the mean, standard 
deviation and skewness of the real credit growth rate, respectively.  it X  is a vector of control variables that 
includes initial human capital, the average population growth rate, and life expectancy. Column (1) shows the 
results for a standard cross section regression, estimated by OLS for the sample period 1980 to 1999. Column 
(2) shows the results for a non-overlapping panel regression with two periods, one from 1980-1989 and one 
from 1990 to 1999. Column (3) reports the results from an overlapping panel regression. For each country and 
each variable, we construct 10-year averages starting with the period 1980-1989 and rolling it forward to the 
period 1990-1999. Column (4) separates the sample in HEC and MEC countries. The panel regression is 
estimated using a GLS estimator. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are computed using the Newey 
and West procedure and are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at the 10 percent level and ** 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  
 
Wald Tests  
    
H0: Sum of HEC and MEC coefficient=0 
  F-statistic (p-value) 
Credit-mean  5.029 0.025 
Credit-variance  4.430 0.038 
Credit skewness  0.005 0.942 
 
11bumpiness captures the ‘good volatility’ associated with the type of risktak ing that eases
ﬁnancial constraints and increases investment.18 Notice that a country with high variance
need not have negative skewness.
Figure 3 shows graphically the linkbetween GDP growth and the moments of credit
growth across MECs. It is evident that higher long run GDP growth is associated with
(a) a higher mean growth rate in credit, (b) lower variance and (c) negative skewness. In
other words, high GDP growth rates are associated with a risky and bumpy credit path.
Consider speciﬁc examples: Chile, Thailand and Korea, exhibit negatively skewed credit
growth and high GDP growth. In contrast, countries that do not exhibit negative skewness,
like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Morocco have low growth. China and Ireland are notable
outliers: they have experienced very high GDP growth in the last twenty years, but have
not experienced a crisis.
In sum, our ﬁndings show that MECs that followed a risky credit path and have ex-
perienced boom-bust episodes have on average grown faster than MECs with stable credit
conditions. These results do not imply that crises are good for growth. They say that under-
taking credit risk has led to higher growth, but as a side-eﬀect, it has also led to occasional
crises.
3M odel
We consider an inﬁnite horizon endogenous growth model of a two-sector small open economy
with credit market imperfections. There are two goods: a tradable (T) good, which is a
consumption good, and a nontradable (N) good, which is used as an input in the production
of both goods. We will denote the relative price of N-goods (i.e., the inverse of the real
exchange rate) by pt = pN
t /pT
t . The only source of uncertainty is endogenous real exchange
rate risk: in equilibrium pt+1 may equal pt+1 with probability ut+1 or p
t+1 with probability
1 − ut+1. The probability ut+1 may equal either 1 or u, and this is known at t.
There are competitive riskneutral international investors whose cost of funds equals the
world interest rate r. These investors lend any amount as long as they are promised an
18This view is consistent with the ﬁndings of Imbs (2002).
12Figure 3: Moments of Credit and GDP Growth
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Note: The graphs plot the moments of real credit growth from 1988-1999 against the residuals of a growth 
regression that controls for initial per capita GDP and population growth.  13expected payoﬀ of 1 + r. They also issue default-free bonds: an N-bond and a T-bond.
The T-bond pays 1+r next period, while the N-bond pays (1 + rn
t )pt+1. The existence






t+1 =1+r, where p
e
t+1 := ut+1pt+1 +( 1−ut+1)p
t+1 (2)
There is a continuum, of measure one, of competitive ﬁrms that produce the T-good
using a nontradable input (dt) and a non-reproducible factor (lT
t ). The representative T-



















1−α,α ∈ (0,1) (3)
There is a continuum, of measure one, of consumers. The representative consumer is
inﬁnitely lived, consumes only T-goods, and is endowed with one unit of the non-reproducible
factor, which he supplies inelastically (lT
t =1 ) . Furthermore, he can buy and sell any amount

















where Tt is the tax that will ﬁnance the bailouts.
There is a continuum, of measure one, of ﬁrms that produce N-goods using entrepreneurial
labor (lt), and capital (kt). Capital consists of N-goods invested during the previous period





t , Θt =: θkt
1−β
,k t = It−1,β ∈ (0,1) (5)
The technological parameter Θt embodies an external eﬀect, where kt is the average N-sector
capital, that each ﬁrm takes as given.
The investable funds of an N-ﬁrm consist of its cash ﬂow wt plus the debt it issues. In
order to capture the debt denomination decision we assume that the ﬁrm can issue T-debt
(bt) and N-debt (bn




t , respectively. Funds can be used to buy default-free bonds (st,s n
t ) or N-goods
(ptIt) in order to produce N-goods in the following period. Since bt and bn
t are measured in
T-goods, the time t budget constraint and time t +1proﬁts are, respectively
ptIt + st + s
n
t = wt + bt + b
n
t (6)




t − vt+1lt+1 − Lt+1 − pt+1L
n
t+1 (7)
Firms are run by overlapping generations of entrepreneurs who live for two periods and
consume only tradables in the second period of their life. At the beginning of time t a young
entrepreneur supplies inelastically one unit of labor (lt =1 )and receives a wage vt. At the
end of time t she takes control of the ﬁrm and makes investment and ﬁnancing decisions.
The cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm equals the entrepreneur’s wage: wt = vt.
N-sector ﬁnancing is subject to two credit market imperfections: contract enforceability
problems and systemic bailout guarantees that cover lenders against systemic crises. The
former will give rise to borrowing constraints in equilibrium, while the latter will induce ﬁrms
to undertake insolvency risk through currency mismatch. We model these imperfections using
the credit market game of Schneider and Tornell (2003), henceforth ST.
Contract Enforceability Problems. Entrepreneurs cannot commit to repay debt: if at time t
the entrepreneur incurs a non-pecuniary cost h[wt + bt + bn
t ], then at t +1she will be able
to divert all the returns provided the ﬁrm is solvent.
Systemic Bailout Guarantees. There is a bailout agency that pays lenders the outstanding
debts of all defaulting ﬁrms if more than 50% of ﬁrms become insolvent (i.e., π(pt−1) < 0).
The guarantee applies to both N- and T-debt. The bailout agency recuperates a share µ of
the insolvent ﬁrms’ revenues. The remainder is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes on consumers.
The goal of every entrepreneur is to maximize next period’s expected proﬁts net of diver-
sion costs. Since guarantees are systemic, the decisions of entrepreneurs are interdependent.
Therefore, their decisions will be determined in the following credit market game considered
by ST. During each period t, taking prices as given, every young entrepreneur proposes a
plan Pt =( It,s t,s n
t ,b t,b n
t ,ρ t,ρn
t ) that satisﬁes budget constraint (6). Lenders then decide
whether to fund these plans. Finally, funded young entrepreneurs make investment and
diversion decisions.
15Payoﬀs are determined at t + 1. Consider ﬁrst plans that do not lead to diversion. If
the ﬁrm is solvent (π(pt+1) ≥ 0), the old entrepreneur pays vt+1 to the young entrepreneur
and Lt+1 + pt+1Ln
t+1 to lenders. She then consumes the proﬁt ce
t+1 = π(pt+1). In contrast,
if the ﬁrm is insolvent (π(pt+1) < 0), young entrepreneurs receive µwpt+1qt+1 (µw < 1 − β),
lenders receive the bailout if any is granted, and old entrepreneurs get nothing. If a diversion
scheme is in place and the ﬁrm is solvent, the old entrepreneur gets βpt+1qt+1 and nothing
otherwise; young entrepreneurs get [1 − β]pt+1qt+1 and lenders receive the bailout if any is
granted. The problem of a young entrepreneur is then to choose an investment plan Pt and
diversion strategy ηt to solve:
max
Pt,ηt
Et(ξt+1{pt+1qt+1 + (1 + r)st + pt+1(1 + rn)sn
t − vt+1lt+1
−[1 − ηt][Lt+1 + pt+1Ln
t+1]− hηt[wt + bt + bn
t ]}) s.t. (6),
where ηt =1if the entrepreneur has set up a diversion scheme, and zero otherwise; and
ξt+1 =1if π(pt+1) ≥ 0, and zero otherwise. The following deﬁnition integrates the credit
market game with the rest of the economy.
Deﬁnition. A symmetric equilibrium is a collection of stochastic processes
{It,s t,s n
t ,b t,b n
t ,ρ t,ρ n
t ,d t,c t,y t,q t,u t,p t,w t,v t,v T
t } such that, (i) given current prices and
the distribution of future prices the plan (It,s t,s n
t ,b t,b n
t ,ρ t,ρn
t ) is determined in a symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium of the credit market game, dt maximizes T-ﬁrms proﬁts and
ct maximizes consumers expectedutility; (ii) factor markets clear; and (iii) the market for
non-tradables clears: dt + It = qt.
To close the model we assume that date zero young entrepreneurs are endowed with
w0 =( 1− β)poqo units of T-goods, while old entrepreneurs are endowed with qo units of
N-goods and have no debt in the books. Finally, we impose the condition that guarantees




j[1 − ξt+j][Lt+j + pt+jL
n
t+j − µpt+jqt+j − Tt+j]=0 ,µ ∈ [0,β]. (8)
3.1 Discussion of the Setup
To investigate how the forces that generate higher growth also generate ﬁnancial fragility
we consider a setup with no exogenous shocks. In equilibrium fragility will arise from a self-
16reinforcing mechanism: N-ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to issue T-debt in the presence of systemic
guarantees and suﬃcient real exchange rate variability. This variability, in turn, may arise
because there is enough T-debt issued by N-ﬁrms. Clearly, there are other self-reinforcing
mechanisms that generate endogenous ﬁnancial fragility. The concrete mechanism we model
here, however, captures some features of recent boom-bust episodes.
In our setup there are complete markets. Since during each period the real exchange
rate can take only two values, the menu of securities allows consumers and ﬁrms to hedge
all risk.19 This will allow us to make the point that growth and welfare gains arise from the
undertaking of credit risk, not from consumption smoothing.
The assumption that N-goods are used as inputs is key. The use of N-inputs in N-
production is necessary for the existence of endogenous real exchange rate variability. Oth-
erwise, self-fulling crises could not occur. The use of N-inputs in T-production together with
external eﬀects in N-production imply that the N-sector is the source of endogenous growth
in the economy. This, in turn, underlies the result that the undertaking of credit risk by
increasing N-production may increase social welfare, and that the T-sector may derive a net
beneﬁt from ﬁnancing the ﬁscal costs of the guarantees. In contrast, the assumptions that
N-goods are not consumed and T-goods are not intermediate inputs are convenient but not
essential.20
To capture the dynamic and the static eﬀects of crises we have allowed for two types of
crisis costs: ﬁnancial distress ((1 − β)/µw) and bankruptcy costs (β/µ). All the equilibria
we characterize exist for any µw ∈ (0,1 −β) and µ ∈ [0,β].
Financing opportunities are asymmetric across sectors because only N-sector credit is
aﬀected by contract enforceability problems. This assumption captures the fact that most
of the ﬁrms in MECs that can access international ﬁnancial markets are in the T-sector. In
contrast, most N-sector ﬁrms are dependent on domestic bankcredit. 21
The agency problem and the two-period lived entrepreneur set-up is taken from ST. The
19I np a r t i c u l a r ,N - d e b ti sap e r f e c th e d g ef o rN - s e c t o rﬁ r m s .
20If N-goods were consumed, there would a deeper fall in the demand of N-goods when N-ﬁrms become
insolvent, accentuating the self-fulﬁlling depreciation that generates crisis.
21This is in part because T-ﬁrms can either pledge export receivables as collateral, or can get guarantees
from closely linked ﬁrms. Tornell and Westermann (2003) document sectorial asymmetries as well as systemic
guarantees in MECs.
17advantage of this set-up is that one can analyze ﬁnancial decisions period-by-period. This
will allow us to explicitly characterize the stochastic processes of prices and investment and
derive the limit distribution of growth rates.
Finally, the assumption that bailout guarantees are systemic is essential. If instead, guar-
antees were unconditional and a bailout were granted whenever a single borrower defaulted,
then the guarantees would neutralize the contract enforceability problems and borrowing
constraints would not arise in equilibrium.
3.2 Symmetric Equilibria (SE)
We construct SE in two steps. First, we take prices (pt) and the likelihood of crisis (1−ut+1)
as given, and derive the equilibrium at a point in time. We then endogeneize pt and ut+1.
In order to simplify notation we will set at =1in (3).
The representative T-ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts, taking goods and factor prices as given. It
thus sets ptdt = αyt and vT
t lT
t =( 1− α)yt. Since consumers supply inelastically one unit
of the non-reproducible factor, equilibrium T-output, consumer’s income and the T-sector












Since the consumer has access to complete capital markets and his subjective discount





j[(1 − α)yt+j − Tt+j]
￿
(10)
In any SE the representative N-ﬁrm’s capital (kt) is equal to aggregate average capital
(¯ kt). Thus, (5) implies that N-output equals: qt+1 = θkt+1 = θIt. N-sector investment (It) is
determined by the equilibria of the credit market game, which are characterized in ST and
summarized in the next proposition.
18Proposition 3.1 (Symmetric Credit Market Equilibria (CME)) There is investment




















Suppose (11) holds. Then,
i There always exists a ‘safe’CME in which insolvency risk is hedged ( bt =0 ) . Credit and
investment are: bn
t =[ ms −1]wt and It = ms wt
pt , with ms =
1
1−hδ.





u, there also exists a ‘risky’CME in which
currency mismatch is optimal (bn
t =0 ) . Credit and investment are: bt =[ mr − 1]wt
and It = mr wt
pt , with mr = 1
1−u−1hδ.
Given that all other entrepreneurs choose the safe plan (i), an entrepreneur knows that
no bailout will be granted next period. Since lenders must break-even, the entrepreneur
must internalize all bankruptcy costs. Thus, she will not set a diversion scheme and will
hedge insolvency riskby denominating all debt in N-goods. Since the ﬁrm will never go bust
and lenders must breakeven, the interest rate that the entrepreneur has to oﬀer satisﬁes
[1 + ρn
t ]Et(pt+1)=1+r. Since (11) holds, investment yields a return which is higher than
the opportunity cost of capital.22 Thus, the entrepreneur will borrow up to an amount that
makes the credit constraint binding: (1 + r)bn
t ≤ h(wt + bn
t ). Substituting this borrowing
constraint in the budget constraint ptIt = wt +bn
t generates the investment equation. Notice
that a necessary condition for borrowing constraints to arise is h<1+r. If h, the index of
contract enforceability, were greater than the cost of capital, it would always be cheaper to
repay debt rather than to divert.
Given that all other entrepreneurs choose the risky plan (ii), a young entrepreneur expects
a bailout in the low state, but not in the high state. The proposition shows that, in spite of
the guarantees, diversion schemes are not optimal. Thus, borrowing constraints bind. Will
the entrepreneur choose T-debt or N-debt? She knows that all other ﬁrms will go bust in
the bad state (i.e., π(p










t − (δpt)−1 = Et(pt+1)θβ − (δpt)−1. This is
b e c a u s ei na nS EΘt = θ¯ k
1−β
t , ¯ kt = kt and lt =1 .
19since there are systemic guarantees, lenders will get repaid in full. Thus, the interest rate on
T-debt that allows lenders to break-even satisﬁes 1 +ρt =1+r. It follows that the beneﬁts
of a risky plan derive from the fact that choosing T-debt over N-debt reduces the cost of
capital from 1+r to [1+r]u. Lower expected debt repayments ease the borrowing constraint
as lenders will lend up to an amount that equates u[1+r]bt to h[wt+bt]. Thus, investment is
higher relative to a plan ﬁnanced with N-debt. The downside of a risky plan is that it entails
a probability 1−u of insolvency. Will the two beneﬁts of issuing T-debt —more and cheaper
funding— be large enough to compensate for the cost of bankruptcy in the bad state? If
there is suﬃcient real exchange rate variability and u is not too low, expected proﬁts under
a risky plan exceed those under a safe plan: uπr(pt+1) >u π s(pt+1)+( 1− u)πs(p
t+1).
To sum up, Proposition 3.1 makes three key points. First, binding borrowing constraints
arise in equilibrium and investment is constrained by cash ﬂow, provided the production of
N-goods is a positive NPV undertaking: Re
t+1 ≥ 1+r. Second, agents optimally choose
T-denominated debt if there is suﬃcient real exchange rate variability so that ﬁrms go bust
in the low price state: π(p
t+1) < 0. Third, such a risky currency mismatch eases borrowing
constraints and allows ﬁrms to invest more than under perfect hedging: mr >m s.
3.2.1 Equilibrium Dynamics
In this subsection we endogeneize prices and determine the conditions under which there is a
self-validating process {pt, ¯ pt+1,p
t+1,u t+1}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes the return conditions speciﬁed in
Proposition 3.1. We start by characterizing the transition equations. If a ﬁrm is solvent, the
young entrepreneur’s wage equals the marginal product of her labor, while under insolvency








if π(pt) ≥ 0
if π(pt) < 0,
µw ∈ (0,1 − β) (12)
Suppose for a moment that (11) holds, so that it is optimal to invest all funds in the
production of N-goods: ptIt = mtwt. It then follows from (12) that N-sector investment is






if π(pt) ≥ 0




20Since in an SE qt = θIt−1, it follows from (9), (13) and the market clearing condition
(dt + It = qt) that equilibrium N-output, prices and T-output evolve according to
qt = θφt−1qt−1 (14)
pt = α[qt(1 − φt)]
α−1 (15)





Clearly, for prices to be positive it is necessary that the share of N-output purchased by the
N-sector φt is less than one:
h<u t+1βδ
−1 (17)
Equations (13)-(16) form an SE provided the implied returns validate the agents’ expecta-
tions (speciﬁed in Proposition 3.1). The next two propositions characterize two such SE: a
safe one in which crises never occur, and a risky one where all ﬁrms become insolvent in the
low price state and are solvent in the high price state.
Proposition 3.2 (Safe Symmetric Equilibria (SSE)) There exists an SSE if and only
if the degree of contract enforceability h is low enough and N-sector productivity θ is large
enough. In an SSE there is no currency mismatch (bt =0 )and crises never occur (ut+1 =1 ) .




This proposition states that an SSE exists provided enforceability problems are severe,
so that there are borrowing constraints and φt < 1; and productivity is high enough, so that
the return on investment is attractive enough.
In an SSE all entrepreneurs select the safe plan of Proposition 3.1 during every period.
This implies that there is no currency mismatch in the aggregate, and self-fulﬁlling crises
are not possible (ut+1 =1 ) . Therefore, the production of N-goods has a positive net present





−1. This condition, as well as
(17), hold provided h is low enough and θ is high enough.
Next, we characterize Risky Symmetric Equilibria (RSE). We have seen that entrepre-
neurs will take on T-debt only if there is enough anticipated real exchange rate variability to
generate high returns in the good state and a critical mass of insolvencies in the bad state.
We now reverse the question and askinstead when a risk y debt structure implies enough
21real exchange rate variability. That is: (i) will the low price be low enough so that there will
be widespread insolvencies (π(p
t+1) < 0)? (ii) will there be a suﬃciently high return in the
good state to ensure that the ex-ante expected return is high enough (Re
t+1 ≥ 1 + r)?
The following proposition provides answers to these questions, and it establishes that the
self-reinforcing mechanism we described above is at work. On the one hand, expected real
exchange rate variability makes it optimal for entrepreneurs to denominate debt in T-goods
and run the riskof going bust. On the other hand, the resulting currency mismatch at the
aggregate level makes the real exchange rate variable, validating agents’ expectations.
Proposition 3.3 (Risky Symmetric Equilibrium (RSE)) There exists an RSE if and
only if the probability of crisis (1 − u) is small enough, N-sector productivity (θ) is large
enough, and the degree of contract enforceability (h) is low, but not too low.
1. In any RSE multiple crises can occur during which all N-sector ﬁrms default and there
is a sharp real depreciation. However, two crises cannot occur in consecutive periods.
2. In the RSE where there is a reversion back to a risky path in the period immediately
after the crisis, all ﬁrms choose risky plans in no-crisis times and safe plans in crisis
times. The probability of a crisis and the N-sector’s investment share satisfy:




1 − u if t ￿= τi












1−hδ if t = τi
(18)
where τi denotes a crisis time.
A key property of the RSE characterized in Proposition 3.3 is that a crisis state is not
an absorbing state: a crisis can occur every other period independently of the number of
previous crises. Since we are interested in long run growth, it is essential that the economy
follows a risky path for a long time. This entails having multiple crises.
To see the intuition consider a typical period t and suppose that all inherited debt is
denominated in T-goods and agents expect a bailout at t+1 in case a majority of ﬁrms goes
bust. Since the debt burden is independent of prices there are two market clearing prices as
in Figure 4. In the ‘solvent’ equilibrium (point A in Figure 4), the price is high enough to
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23allow the N-sector to buy a large share of N-output. In contrast, in the ‘crisis’ equilibrium
of point B, the price is so low that N-ﬁrms go bust: βp
tqt <L t.23
The key to having multiple equilibria is that part of the N-sector’s demand comes from
the N-sector itself. Thus, if the price fell below a cutoﬀ level and N-ﬁrms went bust, the
investment share of the N-sector would fall (from φ
l to φ
c). This, in turn, would reduce the
demand for N-goods, validating the fall in the prices. Notice that the upper bound on h and
t h el o w e rb o u n do nθ ensure that when crises are rare events, borrowing constraints arise
and investment is proﬁtable (i.e., (11) holds). Meanwhile, the lower bound on h ensures that
ﬁrms with T-debt go bust in the bad state, and that the fall in cash ﬂow is translated into
a large fall in credit and N-investment. This validates the fall in prices.
Two points are worth emphasizing. First, Proposition 3.3 holds for any µw ∈ (0,1 − β)
and µ ∈ [0,β]. That is, crisis costs are not necessary to trigger a crisis. A shift in expectations
is suﬃcient:a crisis can occur whenever entrepreneurs expect that others will not undertake
credit risk, so that there is a reversion to the safe CME characterized in Proposition 3.1.
Second, two crises cannot occur consecutively. Since investment in the crisis period falls, the
supply of N-goods during the post-crisis period will also fall. This will drive post-crisis prices
up, preventing the occurrence of insolvencies even if all debt were T-debt. That is, during
the post-crisis period a drop in prices large enough to generate insolvencies is impossible.
4 Growth and Skewness
Here we will link Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 to our empirical ﬁndings by characterizing the
growth rates of GDP and credit along risky and safe SE. Since N-goods are intermediate
inputs, while T-goods are ﬁnal consumption goods, gross domestic product equals the value
of N-sector investment plus T-output: gdpt = ptIt + yt. It then follows from (13)-(16) that,
in any SE, GDP is given by






1 −(1 − α)φt
[1 − φt]1−α (19)
As we can see, the key determinant of the evolution of GDP is the share of N-output invested
by the N-sector: φt. This share is determined by the cash ﬂow of young entrepreneurs and by
23For a discussion of the role of multiple equilibria in explaining ﬁnancial crises see Cole and Kehoe (2000).
24the credit they can obtain. It follows from Proposition 3.1 that in an SE the credit extended





[φt −(1 − β)]qt
[φt −µw]qt
if π(pt) ≥ 0
if π(pt) < 0
(20)
4 . 1 G r o w t hi naS a f eE c o n o m y
In an SSE the investment share φt is constant and equal to φ
s. Thus, (19) implies that GDP

















Absent exogenous technological progress in the T-sector, the endogenous growth of the N-
sector is the force driving growth in both sectors. As the N-sector expands, N-goods become
more abundant and cheaper allowing the T-sector to expand production. This expansion is
possible if and only if N-sector productivity (θ) and the N-investment share (φ
s) are high





s > 1. Notice that
for any positive growth rate of N-output, γs increases with the intensity of the N-input in
the production of T-goods (α).
The mechanism by which higher growth in the N-sector induces higher growth in the
T-sector is the decline in the relative price of N-goods that takes place in a growing economy
pt+1
pt =[ θφ
s]α−1. If there were technological progress in the T-sector, there would be a Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect and the real exchange rate would appreciate over time.24
4 . 2 G r o w t hi naR i s k yE conomy
Proposition 3.3 shows that any RSE is composed of a succession of lucky paths punctuated
by crisis episodes. In the RSE characterized by (3.3) the economy is on a lucky path at time
t if there has not been a crisis either at t−1 or at t. Since along a lucky path the investment
share equals φ



















24Suppose the technological parameter in the T-production function grows over time
at+1
at = (1+g).T h e n




25A comparison of (21) and (22) reveals that as long as a crisis does not occur, growth in a risky
economy is higher than in a safe economy. Along the lucky path the N-sector undertakes
insolvency risk by issuing T-debt. Since there are systemic guarantees, ﬁnancing costs fall
and borrowing constraints are relaxed, relative to a safe economy. This increases the N-
sector’s investment share (φ
l >φ
s). Since there are sectorial linkages (α>0), this increase
in the N-sector’s investment share beneﬁts both the T- and the N-sectors and fosters faster
GDP growth.
However, in a risky economy a self-fulﬁlling crisis can occur with probability 1 − u, and
during a crisis episode growth is lower than along a safe path. We have seen that any crisis
episode consists of at least two periods:in the ﬁrst period the ﬁnancial position of the N-
sector is severely weakened and the investment share falls from φ
l to φ
c <φ
s;t h e ni nt h e
second period it jumps back to φ
l. Since these transitions occur with certainty, the mean




























crisis period post-crisis period
(23)
The second equality in (23) shows that the average loss in GDP growth stems only from the




2. This reduction comes about through
two channels:ﬁnancial distress (indexed by
µw
1−β) and a reduction in risk taking and leverage
(indexed by
1−hδ
1−hδu−1). Notice that variations in GDP growth generated by real exchange rate
changes at τ and τ + 1 cancel out. We will come back to this below.
A crisis has long-run eﬀects because N-investment is the source of endogenous growth,
and so the level of GDP falls permanently. This raises two questions:is mean long-run GDP
growth in a risky economy greater than in a safe one? Does an increase in risk taking (i.e.,
an increase in the probability of crisis) in a risky economy increase mean long-run GDP
growth? The answers to these questions are not straightforward because an increase in the
probability of crisis (1 − u) has opposing eﬀects on long-run growth. One the one hand, a
greater 1−u increases investment and growth along the lucky path by increasing the subsidy
implicit in the guarantee and allowing ﬁrms to be more leveraged. On the other hand, a
greater 1−u makes crises more frequent. Therefore, to give a precise answer to the questions
26we have raised, we compute the limit distribution of GDP’s growth rate.
Figure 5 exhibits one realization of the paths of GDP, credit, T- and N-output associated
with a set of parameters satisfying the conditions in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3. This ﬁgure
makes clear that greater long run growth comes at the cost of (rare) crises. Notice that
since N-goods are used as inputs in both sectors, higher N-sector investment leads to a lower










time, however, T-output along the risky path will overtake that in a safe path.
Growth Limit Distribution. In any RSE two crises cannot occur in consecutive periods.
Here, we will derive the limit distribution of GDP’s compounded growth rate (log(gdpt) −
log(gdpt−1)) along the RSE characterized in Proposition 3.3. In this RSE ﬁrms undertake
credit risk the period after the crisis. It follows from (18), (22) and (23) that the growth
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The three elements of Γ are the growth rates in the lucky, crisis and post-crisis states,
respectively. The element Tij of the transition matrix is the transition probability from state i
to state j. Since the transition matrix is irreducible, the growth process converges to a unique









where the elements of Π are the shares of time that an economy spends in each state over the
long-run. It then follows that the mean long run GDP growth rate is E(1+γr)=e x p ( Π ￿Γ).25
That is,
E(1 + γ















A comparison of long run GDP growth rates in (21) and (25) reveals the trade-oﬀs involved
in following safe and risky growth paths, and allows us to determine the conditions under
which credit risk is growth enhancing.
25E(1 +γr) is the geometric mean of 1+γl,1+γlc and 1+γcl.
27Figure 5:Risky vs Safe Economy
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28Proposition 4.1 (Long-run GDP Growth) If ﬁnancial distress during crises is not too
severe (ld ≡ 1−
µw
1−β < ld), there exists an h∗ <u β δ
−1, such that mean long-run GDP growth
is greater in a risky than in a safe equilibrium if and only if the degree contract enforceability














If ld ≥ ld, then h∗ ≥ uβδ
−1 and an RSE does not exist.
Rewriting h>h ∗ as (1 − u)[log(1− β) − log(µw)] < log(φ
l) − log(φ
s) makes clear what
are the costs and beneﬁts associated with a risky path. A risky economy outperforms a
safe one if the beneﬁts of higher investment in no-crisis times (φ
l >φ
s) compensate for the
shortfall in cash ﬂow and investment in crisis times (µw < 1 −β) weighted by the frequency
of crisis (1 − u).
Notice that an increase in distress costs can be compensated by an increase in the degree
of contract enforceability. The latter increases leverage and ampliﬁes the beneﬁts of risk-
taking (∂φ
l/∂h > ∂φ
s/∂h). However,a sh is bounded above to ensure the existence of an
RSE (φ
l < 1 ⇔ h<u β δ
−1), an increase in contract enforceability can compensate for large
but not arbitrarily large distress costs (i.e., µw → 0).26
Figure 6 illustrates the limit distribution of GDP growth rates by plotting diﬀerent GDP
paths corresponding to diﬀerent realizations of the sunspot process. Most of the risky paths
outperform the safe path, except for a few unlucky risky paths. If we increased the number
of paths, the cross section distribution would converge to the limit distribution.
Figure 7 exhibits the two eﬀects of an increase in the probability of crisis (1 − u). A
reduction in u increases the investment multiplier mr at a point in time, but it also increases
the frequency of crises. The ﬁgure shows that for high u the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and the
long-run mean growth rate of GDP goes up. Importantly, u cannot be reduced indeﬁnitely.
After a certain point an RSE ceases to exist.
26How large can “not too large” be?





29Figure 6:Limit Distribution of GDP
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NB: with 1-u=5%, the mean number of crises is 3.8 
% 5 1 % 70 2 . 0 1 76 . 0 35 . 0 65 . 1 : = − = = − = = = u l h parameters
d β α θ
30Figure 7:GDP Growth and Credit Risk


















1-u=8%; mean number of crises=5.9
1-u=5.4%: mean number of crises=4.5
1-u=2.3%: mean  number of crises=2.09
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31Figure 8:GDP Growth and Financial Distress Costs (ld =1−
µw
1−β)
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Finally, Figure 8 shows risky growth paths associated with diﬀerent degrees of crisis’
ﬁnancial distress. As we can see, even if 90% of N-sector cash ﬂow is lost during a crisis, a
risky economy can outperform a safe economy over the long run.
A Crisis Episode. Although the main objective of the model is to address long-run
issues, it is reassuring that it can account for key stylized facts of recent ﬁnancial crises in
MECs. In particular, the real depreciation that coincides with a sharp fall in credit growth,
as well as the asymmetric sectorial response of N- and T-sectors.
If a self-fulﬁlling crisis occurs at some date, say τ,there is a ﬁresale:there is a steep real
32exchange rate depreciation, and since there is currency mismatch, all N-ﬁrms default. As a
result, the investment share falls from φ
l to φ
c.27 The price of N-goods must fall to allow the
T-sector to absorb a greater share of N-output, which is predetermined by τ −1 investment.
At τ +1, N-output contracts due to the fall in investment at the time of the crisis. However,
entrepreneurs adopt risky plans again, so the investment share increases from φ
s back to φ
l.
Thus, there is a real appreciation. At τ +2 , the economy is back on a lucky path, but the
level of cash ﬂow and N-output are below their pre-crisis trend.
Although GDP ﬂuctuations reﬂect changes in the real exchange rate, T-output and N-
investment, and these variables move in diﬀerent directions, GDP growth during a crisis




2 (by (23)). To understand
why this is so note that GDP growth has two components:(i) real exchange rate ﬂuctuations
(captured by
Z(φt)
Z(φt−1)) and (ii) output ﬂuctuations (captured by (θφt)
α).28 In the crisis period,
GDP growth falls below trend because there is a real exchange rate depreciation (
Z(φl)
Z(φc) < 1).
In the post crisis period, there are two eﬀects:(i) since investment contracted during the
previous period, N-output falls below trend and depresses growth; but (ii) there is a rebound






we can see, variations in GDP growth generated by real exchange rate changes at τ and τ +1
cancel out. Thus, the average loss in GDP growth stems only from the fall in the N-sector’s
average investment share.
27This is because young entrepreneurs income is only µwpτqτ instead of [1−β]pτqτ, and at τ entrepreneurs
can only choose safe plans in which there is no currency mismatch (by Proposition 3.3).
28To interpret (23) note that variations in the investment share φt have lagged and contemporaneous
eﬀects on GDP. The lagged eﬀect comes about because a change in φt aﬀects next period’s GDP via its
eﬀect on N-output: qt+1 = θIt = θφtqt. Using (19) and yt = ([1 −φt]qt)













The ﬁrst two terms capture variations in T-output and N-investment, while the third reﬂects real exchange
rate ﬂuctuations. Market clearing in the N—goods market —i.e., (1−φt)ptqt = αyt— implies that the induced
changes in N-sector investment and T-output cancel out. Therefore, the contemporeneous changes in the
investment share aﬀect GDP contemporaneously only through its eﬀect on the real exchange rate. Since
GDPt = Z(φt)qα





∂φt. Thus, we can interpret
Z(φt)
Z(φt−1) as the eﬀect of real
exchange rate ﬂuctuations on GDP.
33In sum, a crisis has two distinct eﬀects:sectorial redist ribution and deadweight losses. At
the time of the crisis the T-sector beneﬁts from the ﬁnancial collapse of the N-sector because
it can buy N-output at ﬁresale prices and expand production. This leads to a sharp fall in
the N-to-T output ratio in the wake of crisis. The deadweight losses derive from the ﬁnancial
distress and the bankruptcy costs implied by crises. The former leads to a contraction in
N-investment and thus has a long-run eﬀect on output. In contrast, bankruptcy costs have
only a static ﬁscal impact.
4.3 Credit Growth
Here, we derive testable implications regarding the link between bumpiness and growth. We
start by showing that the skewness of credit growth is a good indicator of the riskiness of
an economy’s credit path. We then combine this result with Proposition 4.1 to interpret our
empirical results.
It follows from (20) that in an RSE the limit distribution of the compounded growth rate






































As before, the elements of Π are the shares of time that the economy spends in each state.
It follows that
Proposition 4.2 (Skewness) The limit distribution of credit growth in a risky symmetric





2(2(1 − ω) − 1) − 3




ζp−ζc < 1,D :=
ζp−ζc
2 > 0 and ω = u
2−u.
In an RSE N-ﬁrms face endogenous borrowing constraints, and so N-sector credit is
constrained by cash ﬂow. Since along the lucky path —in which no crises occur— cash ﬂow
accumulates gradually, credit can grow only gradually. In contrast, when a crisis erupts
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there are widespread bankruptcies and cash ﬂow collapses. Thus, credit growth falls sharply
(ζ
c <ζ




On the one hand, as long as crises are rare events, the credit growth rates during the
post-crisis period and the lucky path are very close (ζ
p−ζ
l) = log(u−1). On the other hand,
the fall in cash-ﬂow (
1−β
µw ) and in the investment multiplier (
mr
ms) that occur during a crisis













c > 0 (29)
The point made by Proposition 4.2 is that since falls and rebounds occur with the same
frequency, (29) translates into a negatively skewed credit growth rate distribution. That is,
in a long enough sample, the distribution of ζ is characterized by negative outliers.
Figure 9 exhibits the kernel distribution of credit growth for safe and risky economies
for the same set of parameter values as in Figure 5. As we can see, there is a remarkable
similarity between these distributions and those of India and Thailand in Figure 2.
354.3.1 From Model to Data
The degree of contract enforceability h is key in our model. Recall from Propositions 3.1 and
3.2 that borrowing constraints arise in equilibrium only if contract enforceability problems
are severe: h<¯ h = uβδ
−1. In borrowing constrained economies, credit risk can arise only
if h>h(Proposition 3.3). Furthermore, credit risk increases average long-run growth
only if h>h ∗ (Proposition 4.1). Thus, credit risk may be growth-enhancing only in the
set of countries where contract enforceability problems are severe, but not too severe: h ∈
(max{h,h ∗},¯ h). Within this set of economies, a negatively skewed credit growth distribution
identiﬁes those that have followed a risky credit path (by Proposition 4.2).
Notice that if enforceability problems were either not severe or too severe, there would
be no endogenous force to make growth rates negatively skewed to begin with. Thus, the
link between negative skewness and growth would not exist. This argument underlies our
sample selection rule in the empirical section.
In other words, if credit risk is introduced into an economy with severe, but not too
severe, credit market imperfections and a lending boom is set in motion, then average GDP
growth may increase. However, higher average growth comes at the cost of negative skewness
because the boom will be punctuated by rare busts. If this were not the case —i.e., busts
either never occurred or they were very frequent— then the boom would not start in the ﬁrst
place. Whether growth is greater in a risky economy depends on the magnitude of crisis
costs. This is an empirical question that the regressions in Section 2 address.
In our model, growth rates exhibit more variance in the risky economy than in the safe
one. Empirically, however, the variance is not a good instrument for identifying economies
that have followed growth-enhancing risky credit paths that lead to infrequent crises. This is
because higher variance of credit and output growth may also reﬂect high frequency shocks,
which may be exogenous or may be self-inﬂicted by, for instance, bad economic policy. In
our setup, greater mean GDP growth is not associated with higher variance of credit growth
generated by high frequency shocks.
In sum, in order to uncover the link between bumpiness and growth, it is essential to
distinguish infrequent busts from high frequency shocks. Both lead to higher variance, but
only the former leads to negative skewness. This is why the empirical part of the paper uses
36the skewness of credit growth and not the variance, as a measure of bumpiness.
5 Production Eﬃciency and Welfare
We have considered an endogenous growth model where the ﬁnancially constrained N-sector
is the engine of growth because it produces the intermediate input used throughout the
economy. Thus, the share of N-output invested in the N-sector, φt, is the key determinant
of economic growth. When φt is too small T-output is high in the short-run, but long-run
growth is slow. In contrast, when φt is too high, there is ineﬃcient accumulation of N-goods.
In this section we ask three questions. First, what is the Pareto optimal N-investment share
sequence {φt}? Second, can this Pareto optimal investment sequence be replicated in a safe
equilibrium? If not, can ex-ante social welfare be higher in a risky economy where agents
undertake credit risk and crises can occur? Third, is such a welfare improving reallocation
implementable? In particular, will consumers be willing to foot the bill to ﬁnance the bailout
guarantees associated with a risky economy?
5.1 Pareto Optimality
In our set-up, N-goods are intermediate inputs, while T-goods are ﬁnal consumption goods.
Consider then a central planner who maximizes social welfare by investing the supply of
N-goods in the T-sector ([1 − φt]qt := dt) and the N-sector (φtqt), as well as by assigning











t [ct + ce
t − yt] ≤ 0
yt =[ 1− φt]αqα
t ,q t+1 = θφtqt
(30)
Clearly, Pareto optimality implies eﬃcient accumulation of N-inputs: because optimal con-
sumption is a function of the present value of income, the planner should choose the invest-
ment sequence {φt} to maximize the present value of T-production:
￿∞
t=0δ
tyt. We show in





1−α , if α<log(δ
−1)/log(θ) (31)
37The Pareto optimal share equalizes the discount rate δ
−1 to the intertemporal rate of transfor-
mation. A marginal increase in the N-sector investment share (∂φ) reduces today’s T-output
by α[(1 − φ)qt]
α−1∂φ, but increases tomorrow’s N-output by θ∂φ and tomorrow’s T-output
by α[(1 − φ)θφqt]




Can a decentralized economy replicate the Pareto optimal allocation? The optimal N-
investment share is determined by investment opportunities: θ
αδ. In contrast, in a decen-
tralized safe economy the N-investment share (φ
s =
1−β
1−hδ) is determined by the degree of
contract enforceability (h) and by the N-sector’s cash ﬂow (1 − β). Therefore, if either h or
1 − β are low, the N-sector investment share will be lower than the Pareto optimal share:
φ
s <φ
po. That is, when the N-sector is severely credit constrained, low N-sector investment
will keep the economy below production eﬃciency. For future reference we summarize with
the following Proposition.
Proposition 5.1 (Bottleneck) N-sector investment in a safe economy is below the Pareto





When there is a bottleneck, the share of N-inputs allocated to T-production should be
reduced and that allocated to N-production should be increased. This reallocation reduces
the initial level of T-output, but increase its growth rate and the present value of cumulative
T-production. Can the adoption of credit risk induce this reallocation and bring the economy
nearer to the Pareto optimum? Is there a sense in which social welfare increases? Recall
that along a lucky path of an RSE the investment share is greater than the share in a safe
economy. However, credit risk through currency mismatch makes the economy vulnerable to
crises, which entail deadweight losses for the economy. In the next subsection, we consider
the eﬀects of crises and ask whether ex-ante welfare in a risky economy is greater than in a
safe economy.
5.2 Social Welfare
In our model economy consumers have access to complete ﬁnancial markets and their discount
rate equals the riskless interest rate, so their consumption is constant over time. Furthermore,
38N-sector entrepreneurs are risk-neutral. Thus, we can measure ex-ante social welfare with











t[(1 − α)yt + πt − Tt]
￿
(32)
To derive the second equation in (32) notice that in equilibrium consumers’ income is [1−α]yt,
entrepreneurs’ income is equal to their proﬁts πt, and the ﬁscal cost of bailouts is ﬁnanced
with lump-sum taxes. At any t ≥ 1 proﬁts equal old entrepreneurs share in revenues minus





syt−1. Meanwhile, since at t = 0 there
is no debt burden, π0 =
α
1−φsβy0.
In a safe economy ﬁrms are always solvent and crises never occur. Thus, there are no






















α < 1 (33)
Consider a risky economy. Along the lucky path, the investment share is greater than in
a safe economy. Thus, if there is a bottleneck and crises are rare events, the present value
of T-output along the lucky path is greater than in a safe path. However, along a lucky
path a crisis can occur with probability 1 − u. The question then arises as to whether it is
worthwhile to incur the crisis costs in order to attain higher T-output growth.
A crisis involves three costs. First, there is a ﬁscal cost. Lenders receive a bailout payment
equal to the debt repayment they were promised: Lτ = u−1hφ
lpτ−1qτ−1. Since the bailout
agency recuperates only a share µ ≤ β of ﬁrms revenues pτqτ, while the rest is dissipated in
bankruptcy procedures, the ﬁscal cost of a crisis is T(τ)=Lτ − µpτqτ. Second, investment
falls:in a crisis the investment share is φ
c =
µw
1−hδ instead of φ
s in a safe economy. During
crisis borrowing constraints are tighter than in a safe economy because an N-ﬁrm’s net worth
is µwpτqτ instead of [1 − β]pτqτ and risk taking is curtailed:only safe plans are ﬁnanced.
Finally, since during a crisis all N-ﬁrms go bust, old entrepreneurs’ proﬁts are zero.
The deadweight loss of a crisis for the economy as a whole is lower than the sum of
these three costs. During a crisis there is a sharp redistribution from the N- to the T-sector
generated by a severe real depreciation (a ﬁresale). Thus, some of the costs incurred in the
N-sector show up as greater T-output and consumers’ income. We show in the Appendix that
39after netting out the costs and redistributions, a crisis involves two deadweight losses:(i)
the revenues dissipated in bankruptcy procedures: [β − µ]pτqτ; and (ii) the fall in N-sector
investment due to its weakened ﬁnancial position: [(1 − β) − µw]pτqτ. Using the market
clearing condition αyt =[ 1− φt]ptqt, we have that the sum of these two deadweight losses
equals α










kc := 1 −
α[1−µ−µw]
1−φc if t = τi
1 otherwise,
(34)
where τi is a crisis time. In order to compute this expectation we need to calculate the limit


























By comparing (33) and (35) we can determine the conditions under which ex-ante welfare is
greater in a risky economy. The next Proposition provides a suﬃcient condition for credit
risk to be welfare improving.
Proposition 5.2 (Social Welfare) If crises are rare events and the costs of crises (β/µ,
(1 − β)/µw) are small, then ex-ante social welfare in a risky economy is greater than in a
safe economy if and only if there is a bottleneck (φ
s <φ
po).
If crises entail small bankruptcy costs (µ → β) and mild ﬁnancial distress (µw → 1−β),
the only ﬁrst order eﬀect of a crisis is to reduce transitorily the N-sector’s investment share
from φ
l to what it would have been in a safe economy (φ
s). Thus, in this limit case the
investment share in the risky economy would never be lower than in the safe one. Hence, if
there is a ‘bottleneck’ (φ
s <φ
po) and crises are rare events, the greater average investment
share will increase the present value of T-output and hence welfare.
Small crisis costs are suﬃcient, but not necessary, for the result stated in Proposition 5.2.
Welfare in a risky economy can be greater than in a safe one even if crisis costs are large.
Figure 10 shows the welfare diﬀerential between safe and risky economies (W r − W s) for
diﬀerent bankruptcy costs (lb =1−
µ
β) and ﬁnancial distress costs (ld =1−
µw
1−β). As we can
see, the welfare gains can be positive even if 100% of revenues are dissipated in bankruptcy
40Figure 10:Social Welfare and Crisis Costs

























































b = 50% 
l
b = 100% 
Financial Distress Costs (%)
lb = Bankruptcy  Costs (%)
% 5 1 2 . 0 1 76 . 0 35 . 0 65 . 1 : = − = − = = = u h parameters β α θ
41procedures (µ → 0). There can also be positive welfare gains for severe ﬁnancial distress costs
(ld = 80%). However, they are negative when ld → 100%. The reason for this asymmetry is
that bankruptcy costs are a static loss, while ﬁnancial distress costs have dynamic eﬀects. In
our endogenous growth set-up, the reduction in N-sector investment shifts the growth paths
of both sectors downwards. Such an unrecoverable long term loss reduces the discounted sum
of T-production over the whole post-crisis period.29 By contrast, welfare gains are almost
insensitive to bankruptcy costs.
The welfare gain associated with undertaking credit risk is increasing in the probability
of crisis (1 − u). This does not mean that this probability can be arbitrarily large. As we
have discussed earlier, an RSE exists only if crises are rare events. In panel (a) of Figure 11,
we show how W r −Ws varies over a range of crisis probabilities between 0 and 8%. Except
when the ﬁnancial distress cost of crises is very high, the risky economy dominates the safe
economy. This diﬀerence is ampliﬁed by a limited increase in credit risk. In contrast, if crisis
costs are very large, W r−W s < 0 and any increase in risk reduces W r further. Finally, panel
(b) of Figure 11 shows that the social welfare gains are increasing in the intensity of N-inputs
in T-production (α). A greater α strengthens the sectorial linkage and thus increases the
welfare beneﬁts of relaxing the borrowing constraint in the N-sector.
5.3 Implementability
Proposition 5.2 has established that social welfare can be greater in a risky economy even
if bailout costs are funded domestically via lump-sum taxes. Systemic bailout guarantees
are necessary to induce agents to undertake insolvency risk (through currency mismatch).
We have seen that such a risky strategy eases borrowing constraints and leads to a greater
mean growth of N-output even along a path where crises do occur. As a result, T-production
will enjoy cheaper and more abundant N-inputs, and its growth rate will also increase. This
beneﬁts consumers because they receive a share 1 − α of T-output as income.
But, is a bailout scheme implementable? Will consumers be willing to foot the bill? In
particular, will consumers at date zero be willing to purchase an insurance that promises to
29A second order welfare cost of crises is the variability in the level of investment (shift from φ
l to φ
c and
back). Recall that the Pareto optimal investment share is constant.
42Figure 11:Social W elfare Gains and Credit Risk
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43cover any future bankruptcy costs associated with the guarantees? Since the representative
consumer has access to complete capital markets, he can perfectly smooth the cost of the
guarantees. His life time budget constraint is: E0
￿∞
t=0δ
t[ct −(1 − α)yt + Tt] ≤ 0, where Tt
is the tax that will ﬁnance the bailouts. Since the consumer’s share in T-output is 1−α, his







t (yt[1 − α] − Tt) (36)





























c is deﬁned in (53) in the Appendix. The funding of the guarantees by consumers
operates a redistribution from the non-constrained T-sector to the constrained N-sector. If
(37) holds, such a redistribution is to the mutual beneﬁt of both sectors. It is a Pareto-
improving policy. Figure 12 exhibits the consumer’s net welfare gain when he ﬁnances all
the bailout costs for 1 − α =0 .35%. By comparing Figures 11 and 12 we can see that when
social welfare gains are present, consumers welfare gains are also present, but in a smaller
proportion.
6 Related Literature.
Our empirical ﬁndings are related to the literature that links ﬁnancial liberalization to ﬁnan-
cial deepening and growth. In particular, Beckaert et.al. (2001) ﬁnd that countries that have
liberalized their stock markets grow faster than other countries. Chari and Henry (2002) ﬁnd
similar evidence at the ﬁrm level. Levine (2001) shows that ﬁnancial opening fosters growth
by increasing stock market liquidity and the eﬃciency of the banking system. Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2002) show that the long-run gains associated with better functioning ﬁnancial
markets may come at the cost of excessive volatility in the short run. These results stress
the positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on ﬁnancial deepening and the resulting increase
in long run growth. They do not imply however that ﬁnancial openness is growth-enhancing
44Figure 12: Consumers Welfare Gains net of Bailout Costs
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across all sets of countries. In particular, they do not contradict the ﬁndings such as Rodrik
(1998) that openness does not per se accelerate growth.30
Our ﬁnding that negative skewness of credit growth correlates positively with growth
is linked with Imbs (2002) ﬁnding that aggregate volatility is bad growth, while sectorial
volatility is good for growth. In our setup sectorial volatility arises because the credit con-
strained sector undertakes credit risk as a means to increase investment. Levine and Renelt
(1991) and Ramey and Ramey (1995) ﬁnd that the variance of some macroeconomic aggre-
gates is negatively associated to growth. This is not inconsistent with our ﬁndings, as the
variance of credit growth also enters our regressions with a negative sign.
In using skewness to proxy for the occurrence of occasional crises our paper is linked to
30See Prasad, et. al. (2003) for an empirical synthesis of the link between ﬁnancial openess and growth.
45papers in Finance that use the skewness of returns to identify busts (e.g. Veldkamp (2000)).
In the neoclassical growth literature ﬁnancial openness increases growth and welfare by
allowing faster accumulation of capital and consumption smoothing (Barro, et. al. (1995)).
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) show that the welfare beneﬁts associated with this mecha-
nism are negligible in comparison to the increase in domestic productivity. Obstfeld (1994)
demonstrates that domestic productivity gains occur when international risk-sharing allows
a shift from safe to risky projects. In our framework the gains also stem from an increase in
production eﬃciency not from international risk sharing. The gains are obtained by reducing
the contract enforceability problem not the incomplete markets problem: welfare gains are
obtained by letting entrepreneurs take on more risk, not by having consumers face less risk.
In Tirole (2000b) foreign debt denomination also results in social welfare gains, but through
a discipline eﬀect on government policy.
In our model the cycle equilibrium (“the risky economy”) outperforms the pure trend
equilibrium (“the safe economy”) in terms of mean growth and welfare. A similar result is
found in Matsuyama (1999) where the economy evolves along “Solow type” paths of high
investment and “Romer type” paths of high innovation; in Jovanovic (2003) where cycles are
generated by the risky adoption of new technology; and in Francois and Ellis (2003) where
endogenous clustering in innovation and implementation generates growth-enhancing cycles.
The credit cycles in this paper are diﬀerent from Schumpeter’s (1934) cycles in which the
adoption of new technologies plays a key role. Our cycles are more similar to Juglar’s credit
cycles. Juglar (1862, 1863) characterized asymmetric credit cycles along with the periodic
occurrence of crises in France, England, and United States over 1794-1859 as a distinctive
feature of fast developing economies.31
In emphasizing that ﬁnancial development leads both to higher long run growth and to
more short term vulnerability to ﬁnancial crises this paper is related to Loayza and Ranciere
(2001) and Gaytan and Ranciere (2002). In addressing the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization in
the presence of asymmetric ﬁnancing opportunities, this paper relates to Rajan and Zingales
(1998). They show that ﬁnancial development favors the sectors that are more dependent
31“The regular development of wealth does not occur without pain and resistance. In crises everything
stops for a while but it is only a temporary halt, prelude to the most beautiful destinies.” Juglar (1863),
page 13 (our translation).
46on external ﬁnance.
In studying the role of agency problems in emerging markets this paper connects with
Bernanke, et.al. (2000), Mckinnon and Pill (1998), Tirole (2002a), and third generation
crises models like Schneider and Tornell (2003) and the references therein. Our model dif-
fers from the Schneider and Tornell (ST) model in that we consider the interaction of two
productive sectors (N and T), we characterize the long-run growth path of an economy that
can experience several crises, and we make an explicit welfare analysis. Instead, ST concen-
trate on how the interaction of contract enforceability problems systemic bailout guarantees
generate ﬁnancial fragility and a boom-bust episode. In ST there are no productive linkages
as T-output is exogenous, there is no link between skewness and growth because only one
crisis occurs in equilibrium and there is no welfare analysis.
The growth enhancing eﬀect of real-exchange rate risk-taking by the constrained sector
shares some similarities with the role of bubbles in the recent literature. Ventura (2002)
shows that stochastic bubbles on useless assets can boost growth by shifting resources from
ineﬃcient to eﬃcient investors, while introducing ﬁnancial fragility. Ollivier (2000) ﬁnds
that bubbles on real assets can foster growth by encouraging investment in the R&D sector,
and thus can be seen as a subsidy to research. A speculative element is also present in our
framework. However, in our setup there are no bubbles. Our risky equilibria are sustainable
over the inﬁnite horizon. Our results depend on the presence of bottlenecks and do not
exploit any form of dynamic ineﬃciency. Finally, the mechanism we present is reminiscent
of the literature on risk as a factor of production as Sinn (1986) and Konrad (1992).
7 Conclusions
We have shown that there is a strong empirical link between growth and negative skewness
of credit growth across countries with signiﬁcant contract enforceability problems (MECs).
That is, MECs that have experienced booms and busts have grown on average faster than
countries with smooth credit conditions.
We have shown theoretically that in an economy with severe credit market imperfections,
the adoption of credit risk is a means to overcome the obstacles to growth by easing ﬁnancing
47constraints. However, as a side eﬀect ﬁnancial fragility arises and thus crises occur from time
to time. In other words, the trade-oﬀ is not fragility versus no fragility. The trade-oﬀ is:
fragility and growth versus no fragility and no growth.
We have established conditions under which the welfare costs of crises are outweighed by
the beneﬁts of higher growth. Furthermore, we have established conditions under which the
unconstrained tradables sectorwill ﬁnd it proﬁtable to fund the systematic bailout guarantees
that support the risky credit path along which the constrained nontradables sector grows
faster. Under this scheme the tradables sector can also grow faster because it faces less severe
bottlenecks (i.e., more abundant nontradables inputs).
Our results should provide a caution when interpreting the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberal-
ization. From the ﬁnding that liberalization has lead to more bumpiness, one should not
conclude that liberalization per se is bad either for growth or for welfare. Furthermore,
policies intended to eliminate risk taking and fragility might have the unintended eﬀect of
blocking the forces that generate ﬁnancial deepening and growth.
Finally, one point of clariﬁcation is in order. One should diﬀerentiate the onset of a
crisis, the tipping point, from a full-blown crisis. Typically, in the wake of a tipping point
authorities try to delay the inevitable and avoid the necessary real depreciation — as was the
case in both Mexico 1994 and Argentina 2001. The resultant full-blown crisis ends up being
much more severe than what is necessary. We would like to emphasize that the results of
this paper do not justify this type of betting for resurrection.
Appendix
A. Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Proposition 3.2. In an SSE, during every period, all entrepreneurs choose the
safe plan characterized in Proposition 3.1. Each entrepreneur will ﬁnd it optimal to do
so provided a majority of entrepreneurs chooses a safe plan and the marginal return to






Since in an SSE crises never occur, prices are deterministic: ut+1 = 1 and pe
t+1 = pt+1.
Using (14) and (15) it follows that Re
t+1 = βθ
α(φ




−1 and (17) holds. These two conditions are equivalent to
h<¯ h = βδ




48Proof of Proposition 3.3. The proof is in two parts. In part A we consider the case in
which two crises do not occur in consecutive periods. Then, in part B we show that two
crises cannot occur in consecutive periods.
Part A. Consider an RSE in which all entrepreneurs choose the risky plan characterized in
Proposition 3.1 during every period, except when a crisis erupts, in which case they choose
safe plans. In a no-crisis period, given that all other entrepreneurs choose a risky plan,
an entrepreneur will ﬁnd it optimal to do so if and only if Re
t+1 := uβθ
¯ pt+1
pt ≥ 1 + r,a n d
π(p
t+1) < 0. To determine whether these conditions hold note that in an RSE the investment
share φt+1 equals φ
l if N-ﬁrms are solvent, while φt+1 = φ
c if they are insolvent. Replacing






























To derive (40) we have used π(p
t+1)=βp





t . Consider next a crisis period. Given that all other entrepreneurs choose a safe plan,




the post-crisis period there can be no crisis, it follows from the proof of Proposition 3.2 that
this condition is equivalent to βθ
α(φ
s)α−1 ≥ δ
−1. Clearly, this condition is implied by (39).
It follows that there exists an RSE where two crises do no occur in consecutive periods if
and only if (39) and (40) hold and parameters satisfy (17), which is given by
hδ < uβ (41)
“Only if.” We prove that an RSE exists only if u >u ,θ>θ, and h <h<h in three steps.
Step 1. For any θ ∈ ￿+ and any h ∈￿ + there exists no RSE if u → 0. To prove this, let
u → 0. Since θ is bounded and 1 − β<φ
l < 1, it follows that lim
u→0+ uR(u)=0 . Therefore,






δ < R(u) <
h
u,
which is a contradiction.



















, 0 <h< h (42)
Notice that h<his equivalent to (41), and that (39) and (40) hold if and only if δ
−1
￿












, which holds only if h>h .















Notice that uR(u)+( 1−u)R(u) is decreasing in h and an RSE exist only if h>h . Thus, a
necessary condition for an RSE to exist is uR(u)+( 1−u)R(u)
￿
h=h >δ
−1, which is equiva-
lent to (43).
“If.” To establish the existence of an RSE we show that when u → 1 parameter restrictions
(39), (40) and (41) are mutually consistent if (θ,h) ∈ S = {(θ,h) ∈ R2
+| θ>θ ,h ￿ <h<h ￿￿},
with h ≤ h￿ <h ￿￿ ≤ h. We do this in two steps. First, we allow for an upper bound θ<θ d(h).
Then, we replace θ<θ d(h) by tighter bounds on h.
Step 1. We show that for any δ ∈ (0,1),α∈ (0,1), and µw ∈ (0,1 − β) an RSE exists if
(θ,h) ∈ S￿ = {(θ,h) ∈ R2
+| h <h<h, θn(h) <θ<θ d(h)}. Let u = 1, for any δ ∈ (0,1) and
α ∈ (0,1), (41) holds iﬀ h<h = βδ
−1 and (39) holds iﬀ θ ≥ θd(h)=[ δβ(φ
s)α−1]−1/α. Next,







βθα . This condition holds for any µw ∈ (0,1 − β),























Notice that h>his necessary for θn(h) <θ d(h) and that h is unique. Furthermore,






> 0. This expression is strictly increasing in h, it is
satisﬁed if h → h and violated if h =0 . This ensures existence and unicity of a lower bound
h.
Step 2. We show that the sets S￿ and S are equivalent. Consider the following three properties
of θn(h) and θd(h) over (h,h), which are illustrated in the ﬁgure below: (i) θn(h) <θ d(h);






−1)1/α. It follows that for any (θ,h) ∈ S￿, θ>θand
h ∈ (h￿,h ￿￿), where h￿ = θ
−1
n (θ) and h￿￿ =m i n ( θ
−1
n (θ),h) where θ
−1() denotes the inverse
function. Since h ≤ h￿ <h ￿￿ ≤ h, we have that (θ,h) ∈ S￿ ⇒ (θ,h) ∈ S. Similarly, for any
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Part B. We prove by contradiction that two crises cannot occur in consecutive periods.
Suppose that if a crisis occurs at τ,ﬁrms choose risky plans at τ.We will show that it is not
possible, under any circumstances, for ﬁrms to become insolvent in the low price state at τ+1
(i.e., π(p
τ+1) < 0). It suﬃces to consider the case in which ﬁrms undertake safe plans at τ+1,
as p
τ+1is the lowest in this case. Along this path the N-investment share equals φτ = ˜ φ
c
:=
µwmr and φτ+1 = φ









τ+1) < 0 ⇔ βθ
α
￿



















φc ; and (ii)φ
l >φ
c. However, the RHS of (39) is strictly higher than the RHS of
(45) because u>h δis necessary for an RSE to exist. This is a contradiction.￿
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We derive ﬁrst the limit distribution of the growth rate process
∆log(gdpt): =l o g ( gdpt)−log(gdpt−1). Since in an RSE crises cannot occur in two consecutive
periods, ∆log(gdpt) follows a three-state Markov chain characterized by the following growth




























u 1 − u 0
001





Since the transition matrix is irreducible, the growth process converges to a unique limit










the geometric mean long run GDP growth rate —equation (25) in the text— is E(1 + γr)=



































Proof of Proposition 4.2. It follows from limit distribution (27) that the mean, variance
and skewness of the growth rate of credit are
ζ ≡ E(ζ)=[ ωζn + 1−ω





2 ≡ E(ζ − ζ)
2 =[ ω(ζn − ζ)
2 +
1−ω
2 [(ζp − ζ)




σ3 =[ ω(ζn − ζ)
3 + 1−ω
2 [(ζp − ζ)




Let l = ζn −
ζc+ζp
2 , L =
ζp−ζc
2 ,d:= l
L, so that ζn − ζ = 1−ω
2 l, ζ − ζc = L + ωl, and
ζp − ζ = L − ωl. Then,
ζ = L + ωl
σ
2L


















3 − [1 + ωd]
3￿
= d(1 − ω)ω
￿
d
2(2(1 − ω) − 1) − 3
￿
Note that ζc <ζ n <ζ p ⇒| d| < 1. Since 2(1 − ω) − 1 < 1 for all u ∈ (0,1), it follows that
(1 − ω)ω [d2(2(1 − ω) − 1) −3] < 0. Therefore, sk< 0 ⇔ d>0 ⇔ ζn − ζc >ζ p − ζn. Thus,
sk< 0 if and only if ζn − ζc >ζ p − ζn :










− 1 < 0
52Given the parameter restriction µw < 1 − β and the necessary condition for existence of an
RSE u>h δ ,it follows that S￿￿(u) > 0,S (1) < 0 and S(0) < 0. Therefore, S(u) < 0 for any
u ∈ [0,1].￿
Derivation of (30). Any solution to the Pareto problem is characterized by the optimal












θkt − dt if t ≥ 1
q0 − d0 if t =0
,d t ≥ 0,q o given
The Hamiltonian associated with this problem is Ht = δ
t[dt]α+λt[θkt −dt]. Since α ∈ (0,1),
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an optimum are
0=Hd = δ
tα[dt]
α−1 − λt,λ t−1 = Hk = θλt, lim
t→∞
λtkt =0 (46)
Thus, the Euler equation is
ˆ dt+1 =[ δθ]
1
1−αdt = θˆ φdt, ˆ φ := [δθ
α]
1
1−α t ≥ 1 (47)










k1 − d0ˆ φ
1 − ˆ φ
t−1








1 − ˆ φ
t−1
1 − ˆ φ
￿
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1 − ˆ φ
t−1








k1 − d0ˆ φ
1
1 − ˆ φ
￿
iﬀ ˆ φ<1
Since k1 = q0 − d0, the bracketed term equals zero if and only if ˆ d0 =[ 1− ˆ φ]q0. The
accumulation equation then implies that the unique optimal solution is ˆ dt = [1 − ˆ φ]qt.￿
Derivation of (34). To simplify notation we assume temporarily that there is only one






uyt−1,t ￿= {0,τ,τ+1 }
π0 = α























Replacing these expressions in welfare function (32) and using the market clearing condition
ptqt[1 − φt]=αyt,w eg e t



































































































α[1 − (µ + µw)]
1 − φ
c




















1−hδ−µw = 1. Thus, Kc = 1 −
α[1−(µ+µw)]
1−φc . The expression for expected welfare in (34) follows by allowing multiple crises
to take place.
Derivation of (35). Consider T-output net of bankruptcy costs: ˜ yt = Ktyt, where Kt is










￿ yt−1 follows a three-state
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001









































To derive W r in closed form consider the following recursion
V (￿ y0,g 0)=E0
￿∞
t=0 δ
t￿ yt = ￿ y0 + δE0V (￿ y1,g1)
V (￿ yt,g t)=yt + βEtV (￿ yt+1,gt+1) (52)
Suppose that the function V is linear: V (￿ yt,g t)=￿ ytw(gt), with w(gt) an undetermined
coeﬃcient. Substituting this guess into (52), we get w(gt)=1+δEtgt+1w(gt+1). Combining
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This solution exists and is unique provided g1δu+ g2g3δ
2(1 − u) < 1. Equation (35) follows
by noting that at time 0 the economy is in the lucky state: V (y0,g 0)=w1yl
0, and by making






Proof of Proposition 5.2. The welfare of a risky and a safe economy are given by (33)
and (34), respectively. Clearly, if u = 1, both are equal. Since W s does not depend on u,
we will prove the proposition by showing that when crises costs are small (i.e., µ → β and
µw → 1 − β, so that kc → 1) the derivative W r
u := ∂Wr/∂u|u=1 is negative if and only if
φ
s <φ










































where φ = φ
s and φ
￿ = ∂φ




0 =( D − 1)(1 − φ)
α−1(αφ









0 = (D − 1)(αφ









where D = δ(θφ)
α. Since φ<1 and φ
￿ < 0, we have that W r
u < 0 if and only if
δ(θ)α(φ





we can rewrite this condition as W r





po. Since the system
is continuous in u, µ and µw, the result in the Proposition follows.￿
Derivation of (37). Suppose for a moment that there is only one crisis (at τ). Then
consumers welfare is




t(1 − α)yt + δ














yt−1, it follows that
(1 − α)yτ −T(τ)=yτ



































≡ (1 − α)yτK
T
c
If we allow multiple crises to occur, consumer’s welfare is
C








1 if t ￿= τi
KT
c if t = τi
Following the same steps as in the derivation of (35) we get (37).
B. Model Simulations
The behavior of the model economy is determined by eight parameters: u,r ,α,θ,h,β,
µw and µ. We will set the probability of crisis 1−u, the world interest rate r and the share
of N-inputs in T-production α equal to some empirical estimates. Then, given the values of
u, r and α, we determine the feasible set for the degree of contract enforceability h and the
index of total factor productivity in the N-sector θ such that both an RSE and an SSE exist.
The values of β, µw and µ are irrelevant for the existence of equilibria.
In a panel of 39 MECs studied in Tornell and Westermann (2002), the probability of a
crisis in a given period ranges from 5% to 9%. The interest rate r, is set to the average US
interest rate from 1980:1 to 1999:4, which equals 0.075. A survey of Mexican manufacturing
ﬁrms suggests a conservative value for α equal to 35%. We then choose β, θ and h so
that: (i) both an RSE and an SSE exist for the range u ∈ [0.91,1], and (ii) we obtain
plausible values for the growth rates along a safe economy and along a lucky path. In the
baseline case: h =0 .76,θ=1 .65,β=0 .8 and u =0 .95. These parameters imply a safe
GDP growth rate of (1 + γs)=( 1 − β)
α θ




￿α = 8.7%. By comparison, the average growth rate of India over
the period is 5.14% and that of Thailand is 8.14%.
We choose the ﬁnancial distress costs of crises ld =1 −
µw
1−β so that the cumulative decrease
of GDP during a crisis episode is 13%, which is the mean value in the sample considered
by Tornell and Westermann (2002). In the model, the cumulative decrease in GDP growth








s)α. Using the baseline case h =0 .76,





= 0.45. Thus, we set
conservatively ld =0 .7. In the baseline case, the level of bankruptcy costs is free.
Finally, in order for the welfare measures to be bounded, the expected discounted sum of
tradable production has to be ﬁnite. In the safe economy this requires δ(θφ












2(1 − u) < 1. These two conditions impose an upper
bound on α.32 In particular, they hold if α<0.6. Summing up:
Parameters baseline case range of variation
N-sector productivity θ =1 .6
Enforceability of contracts h =0 .76[ 0 .6,0.8]
Intensity of N-inputs in T-production α =0 .35 [0.2,0.6]
Cash ﬂow/sales in N-sector 1 − β =2 0 %
Financial distress costs ld = 70% [30%,99%]
Bankruptcy costs lb = 100% [30%,100%]
Probability of crisis 1 − u =0 .05 [0,0.9]
Discount factor δ =0 .925
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